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Abstract
In this paper, we study the security requirements for remote authentication with password protected
smart card. In recent years, several protocols for password-based authenticated key exchange have been
proposed. These protocols are used for the protection of password based authentication between a client
and a remote server. In this paper, we will focus on the password based authentication between a smart
card owner and smart card via an untrusted card reader. In a typical scenario, a smart card owner inserts
the smart card into an untrusted card reader and input the password via the card reader in order for
the smart card to carry out the process of authentication with a remote server. In this case, we want to
guarantee that the card reader will not be able to impersonate the card owner in future without the smart
card itself. Furthermore, the smart card could be stolen. If this happens, we want the assurance that an
adversary could not use the smart card to impersonate the card owner even though the sample space of
passwords may be small enough to be enumerated by an off-line adversary. At the end of this paper, we
further extend our results to credential storage on portable non-tamper resistant storage devices such as
USB memory sticks.
ACM Computing Classification: E.3 DATA ENCRYPTION; E.4 CODING AND INFORMATION
THEORY; D.4.6 Security and Protection; and K.6.5 Security and Protection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Numerous cryptographic protocols rely on passwords selected by users (people) for strong authen-
tication. Since the users find it inconvenient to remember long passwords, they typically select short
easily-rememberable passwords. In these cases, the sample space of passwords may be small enough
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2to be enumerated by an adversary thereby making the protocols vulnerable to a dictionary attack. It is
desirable then to design password-based protocols that resist off-line dictionary attacks (see, e.g., [?]).
The problem of password-based remote authentication protocols was first studied by Gong, Lomas,
Needham, and Saltzer [?] who used public-key encryption to guard against off-line password-guessing
attacks. In another very influential work [?], Bellovin and Merritt introduced Encrypted Key Exchange
(EKE), which became the basis for many of the subsequent works in this area. These protocols include
SPEKE [?] and SRP [?], [?]. Other papers addressing the above protocol problem can be found in [?],
[?], [?], [?], [?]. In models discussed in the above mentioned papers, we can assume that there is a trusted
client computer for the user to input her passwords. In a smart card based authentication system, this
assumption may no long be true. The smart card reader could be malicious and may intercept the user
input passwords. Furthermore, a smart card could be stolen and the adversary may launch an off-line
dictionary attack against the stolen smart card itself. It is the goal for this paper to discuss the security
models for smart card based remote authentication and to design secure protocols within these models.
In a practical deployment of smart card based authentication systems, there may be other system
requirements. For example, we may be required to use symmetric cipher based systems only or to use
public key based systems. Furthermore, the system may also require that the server store some validation
data for each user or the server do not store any validation (this can be considered as identity based
systems). Furthermore, there may be other requirements such as user password expiration and changes.
In the following, we use an example to show the challenges in the design of secure smart card based
authentication protocols. A traditional way to store or transfer the secret key for each user is to use a
symmetric key cipher such as AES to encrypt user’s long term secret key with user’s password and store
the encrypted secret key on the user’s smart card or USB memory card. This will not meet our security
goals against off-line dictionary attacks. For example, in an RSA based public key cryptographic system,
the public key is a pair of integers (n, e) and the private key is an integer d. With the above mentioned
traditional approach, the smart card contains the value AESα(d) in its tamper resistant memory space,
where α is the user’s password. If such a card is stolen, the adversary could feed a message (or challenge)
m to the smart card for a signature. The adversary needs to input a password in order for the smart card
to generate a signature. The adversary will just pick one α′ from her dictionary and ask the card to
sign m. The card will return a signature s′ on m. If the guessed password α′ is correct, the adversary
should be able to verify s′ on m. Otherwise, s′ could not be verified on m with the public key (n, e).
Thus the attacker will remove α′ from the dictionary. Similar attacks work for Guillou-Quisquater (GQ),
Fiat-Shamir, and Schnorr zero-knowledge identification schemes.
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3This example shows that the “off-line” dictionary attack in the stolen smart card environments is
different from the traditional client-server based off-line dictionary attacks. One potential approach to
defeat this attack is to set a counter in the smart card. That is, the smart card is allowed to sign a certain
number of messages, and then self-destroy it. However, the balance between usability and security should
be carefully considered here. There have been quite a number of papers dealing with smart card based
remote authentications (see, e.g., [?], [?], [?], [?], [?], [?], [?]). However, most of them seem to be finding
attacks on previous proposals and putting forward new ones without proper security justification (or even
a security model).
II. SECURITY MODELS
Halevi and Krawczyk [?, Sections 2.2-2.3] introduced a notion of security for remote authentication
with memorable passwords. They provide a list of basic attacks that a password-based client-server
protocol needs to guard against. Though these attacks are important for password-based authentication,
they are not sufficient for password-protected smart card based remote authentication. In the following,
we provide an extended list of attacks that a password-protected smart card based authentication protocol
needs to protect against. An ideal password-protected smart card protocol should be secure against these
attacks and we will follow these criteria when we discuss the security of password-protected smart card
authentication protocols.
• Eavesdropping. The attacker may observe the communications channel.
• Replay. The attacker records messages (either from the communication channels or from the card
readers) she has observed and re-sends them at a later time.
• Man-in-the-middle. The attacker intercepts the messages sent between the two parties (between
users U and smart card C or between smart card C and servers S) and replaces these with her own
messages. For example, if she sits between the user and the smart card, then she could play the role
of smart card in the messages which it displays to the user on the card reader and at the same time
plays the role of users to the smart card. A special man-in-the-middle attack is the small subgroup
attack. We illustrate this kind of attack by a small example. Let g be a generator of the group G of
order n = qt for some small t > 1. In a standard Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, the client
C chooses a random x and sends gx to the server S , then S chooses a random y and sends gy to
C. The shared key between C and S is gxy . Now assume that the attacker A intercepts C’s message
gx, replaces it with gxq, and sends it to S . A also intercepts S’s message gy , replaces it with gyq ,
and sends it to C. In the end, both C and S compute the shared key gqxy . Since gqxy lies in the
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4subgroup of order t of the group generated by gq , it takes on one of only t possible values. A can
easily recover this gqxy by an exhaustive search.
• Impersonation. The attacker impersonates the user (using a stolen smart card or a fake smart card)
to an actual card reader to authenticate to the remote server, impersonate a card reader to a user
who inserts an authentic smart card, impersonate a card reader and a smart card (a stolen card or a
fake card but without the actual user), or impersonate the server to get some useful information.
• Malicious card reader. The attacker controls the card reader and intercepts the smart card owner’s
input password. Furthermore, the attacker controls all of the communications between smart card
and the card owner via the card reader, and all of the communications between smart card and the
remote server. For example, the attacker may launch a man in the middle attack between the smart
card and smart card owner.
• Stolen smart card. The attacker steals the smart card and impersonates the smart card owner to
the remote server via a trusted or a malicious smart card reader. One exception that we need to
make in our security model is that we will not allow the attacker to control a malicious card reader
to intercept the card owner’s password and then to steal the smart card. There are three kinds of
attackers based on the stolen smart card scenario:
– Smart card is tamper resistant with counter protection. The attacker cannot read the sensitive
information stored in the tamper resistant memory. Furthermore, the attacker may only issue a
fixed amount of queries to the smart card to learn useful information. The smart card will be
self-destroyed if the query number exceeds certain threshold (e.g., the GSM SIM card V2 or
later has this capability).
– Smart card is tamper resistant without counter protection. The attacker cannot read the sensitive
information stored in the tamper resistant memory. However, the attacker may issue large amount
of queries to the smart card to learn some useful information. For example, the attacker may
set up a fake server and uses a malicious card reader to guess the potential password.
– Smart card is not tamper resistant. The attacker (with the card) may be able to break the
tamper resistant protection of the smart card and read the sensitive information stored in the
tamper resistant memory. In this case, the smart card will look more like a USB memory stick
that stores the user credential with password protection. But still there is a difference here. In
order for the user to use USB memory stick based credentials, the user needs the access to
a trusted computer to carry out the authentication. However, one may assume that even if the
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5smart card is not tamper resistant, it is not possible for a malicious card reader to read the
sensitive information on the card within a short time period (e.g., during the time that the card
owner inserts the card into the card reader for an authentication). Thus no trusted card reader
is required for this kind of smart card authentication.
• Password-guessing. The attacker is assumed to have access to a relatively small dictionary of
words that likely includes the secret password α. In an off-line attack, the attacker records past
communications and searches for a word in the dictionary that is consistent with the recorded
communications or carry out interaction with a stolen smart card without frequent server involvement
(the attacker may carry out one or two sessions with server involved and all other activities without
server involvement). In an on-line attack, the attacker repeatedly picks a password from the dictionary
and attempts to impersonate U , C, U and C, or S . If the impersonation fails, the attacker removes
this password from the dictionary and tries again, using a different password.
• Partition attack. The attacker records past communications, then goes over the dictionary and
deletes those words that are not consistent with the recorded communications from the dictionary.
After several tries, the attacker’s dictionary could become very small.
We now informally sketch the definition of security models. We have three kinds of security models.
1) Type I. The attacker A is allowed to watch regular runs of the protocol between a smart card
reader R (could be under the control of A) and the server S , can actively communicate with R
and S in replay, impersonation, and man-in-the-middle attacks, and can also actively control a smart
card reader when the card owner inserts the smart card and inputs her password. Furthermore, the
attacker may steal the smart card from the user (if this happens, we assume that the attacker has
not observed the user password from the previous runs of protocols) and issue a large amount of
queries to the smart card using a malicious card reader. However, we assume that the smart card is
tamper resistant and the attacker could not read the sensitive data from the smart card. A protocol
is said to be secure in the presence of such an attacker if (i) whenever the server S accepts an
authentication session with R, it is the case that the actual user U did indeed insert her smart card
into R and input the correct password in the authentication session; and (ii) whenever a smart
card accepts an authentication session with S , it is the case that S did indeed participate in the
authentication session and the user U did indeed input the correct password.
2) Type II. The capability of the attacker is the same as in the Type I model except that when the
attacker steals the smart card, it can only issue a fixed number of queries to the smart card using
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6a malicious card reader. If the number of queries exceeds the threshold, the smart card will be
self-destroyed.
3) Type III. The capability of the attacker is the same as in the Type I model except that when the
attacker steals the smart card, it will be able to read all of the sensitive data out from the smart
card. But we will also assume that when a card owner inserts the card into a malicious card reader
for a session of authentication, the card reader should not be able to read the information stored
in the tamper resistant section of the card. In another word, the smart card is not tamper resistant
only when the attacker can hold the card for a relatively long period by herself. Another equivalent
interpretation of this assumption is that the attacker may not be able to intercept the password via
the card reader and read the information stored in the card at the same time.
III. SMART CARD BASED SECURE AUTHENTICATION AND KEY AGREEMENT
A. Symmetric key based scheme: SSCA
In this symmetric key based smart card authentication scheme SSCA, the server should choose a master
secret β and protect it securely. The Set up phase is as follows:
• For each user with identity C and password α, the card maker (it knows the server’s master secret β)
sets the card secret key as K = H(β, C) and stores K = Eα(K) in the tamper resistant memory of
the smart card, where E is a symmetric encryption algorithm such as AES and H is a hash algorithm
such as SHA-2.
In the SSCA scheme, we assume that the smart card has the capability to generate unpredictable
random numbers. There are several ways for smart card to do so. One of the typical approaches is to use
hash algorithms and EPROM. In this approach, a random number is stored in the EPROM of the smart
card when it is made. Each time, when a new random number is needed, the smart card reads the current
random number in the EPROM and hash this random number with a secret key. Then it outputs this
keyed hash output as the new random number and replace the random number content in the EPROM
with this new value. In order to keep protocol security, it is important for the smart card to erase all
session information after each protocol run. This will ensure that, in case the smart card is lost and the
information within the tamper resistant memory is recovered by the attacker, the attacker should not able
to recover any of the random numbers used in the previous runs of the protocols. It should be noted
that some smart card industry uses symmetric encryption algorithms to generate random numbers. Due
to the reversible operation of symmetric ciphers, symmetric key based random number generation is not
recommended for smart card implementation.
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reader asks the user to input the password which will be forwarded the password to the smart card.
1) Using the provided password α, the card decrypts K = Dα(K). If the password is correct, the
value should equal to H(β, C). The card selects a random number Rc, computes RA = EK(C, Rc),
and sends the pair (C, RA) to the card reader which will be forwarded to the server.
2) The server recovers the value of (C, Rc) using the key K = H(β, C) and verifies that the identity C
of the card is correct. If the verification passes, the server selects a random number Rs, computes
RB = EK(C, Rs), and sends (C, RB , Cs) to the card reader which forwards it to the card. Here
Cs = HMACsk(S, C, Rs, Rc) is the keyed message authentication tag on (S, C, Rs, Rc) under the
key sk = H(C,S, Rc, Rs) and S is the server identity string.
3) The card recovers the value of (C, Rs) using the key K = H(β, C), computes sk = H(C,S, Rc, Rs),
and verifies the HMAC authentication tag Cs. If the verification passes, it computes its own
confirmation message as Cc = HMACsk(C,S, Rc, Rs) and sends Cc to the server. The shared
session key will be sk.
4) The server accepts the communication if the HMAC tag Cc passes the verification.
The protocol SSCA message flows are shown in the Figure 1
Fig. 1. Message flows in SSCA
Card −→ Server : C, EK(C, Rc)
Card ←− Server : EK(C, Rs), Cs
Card −→ Server : Cc
In the following, we use heuristics to show that SSCA is secure in the Type I and Type II security
models. If the underlying encryption scheme E and HMAC are secure, then eavesdropping, replay, man-in-
the-middle, impersonation, password-guessing, and partition attacks will learn nothing about the password
since no information of password is involved in these messages. Furthermore, a malicious card reader can
intercept the password, but without the smart card itself, the attacker will not be able to learn information
about the secret key K = Dα(K). Thus the attacker will not be able to impersonate the server or the card
owner. When the attacker steals the smart card (but she has not controlled a cart reader to intercept the
card owner password in the past), she may be able to insert the card into a malicious card reader and let
the card to run the protocols with a fake server polynomial many times. In these protocol runs, the attacker
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8could input guessed password α′. The smart card will output (C, EK ′(C, Rc)) where K ′ = Dα′(K). Since
the attacker has no access to the actual server (this is an off-line attack), the attacker can not verify
whether the output (C, EK ′(C, Rc)) is in correct format. Thus the attacker has no way to verify whether
the guessed password α′ is correct. In a summary, the protocol is secure in the Type I and Type II security
models.
The protocol SSCA is not secure in the Type III security model. Assume that the attacker has observed
a previous valid run of the protocol (but did not see the password) before steal the smart card. For each
guessed password α′, the attacker computes a potential key K ′ = Dα′(K). If this key K ′ is not consistent
with the observed confirmation messages in the previous run of the protocol, the attacker could remove
α′ from the password list. Otherwise, it guessed the correct password.
If we revise the attacker’s capability in Type III model by restricting the attacker from observing any
valid runs of the protocol before she steals the smart card, we get a new security model which we will call
Type III′ model. We can show that the protocol SSCA is secure in the Type III′ model. The heuristics is
that for an attacker with access to the value K = Eα(K), he will not be able to verify whether a guessed
password is valid off-line. For example, for each guessed password α′, she can compute K ′ = Dα′(K).
But she has no idea whether K ′ is the valid secret key without on-line interaction with the server. Thus
the protocol is secure in the Type III′ security model.
Remarks: Modification of the protocol may be necessary for certain applications. For example, if
the card identification string C itself needs to be protected (e.g., it is the credit card number), then one
certainly does not want to transfer the identification string C along with the message in a clear channel.
B. Public key based scheme: PSCAb
In this section, we introduce a public key based smart card authentication scheme with bilinear groups:
PSCAb, it is based on the identity based key agreement protocol from IEEE 1363.3 [?], [?].
In the following, we first briefly describe the bilinear maps and bilinear map groups.
1) G and G1 are two (multiplicative) cyclic groups of prime order q.
2) g is a generator of G.
3) eˆ : G×G→ G1 is a bilinear map.
A bilinear map is a map eˆ : G×G→ G1 with the following properties:
1) bilinear: for all g1, g2 ∈ G, and x, y ∈ Z , we have eˆ(gx1 , gy2) = eˆ(g1, g2)xy.
2) non-degenerate: eˆ(g, g) 6= 1.
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a group G1 and an efficiently computable bilinear map eˆ : G × G → G1 as above. For convenience,
throughout the paper, we view both G and G1 as multiplicative groups though the concrete implementation
of G could be additive elliptic curve groups.
Let k be the security parameter given to the setup algorithm and IG be a bilinear group parameter
generator. We present the scheme by describing the three algorithms: Setup, Extract, and Exchange.
Setup: For the input k ∈ Z+, the algorithm proceeds as follows:
1) Run IG on k to generate a bilinear group Gρ = {G,G1, eˆ} and the prime order q of the two groups
G and G1. Choose a random generator g ∈ G.
2) Pick a random master secret β ∈ Z∗q .
3) Choose cryptographic hash functions H : {0, 1}∗ → G and pi : G × G → Z∗q . In the security
analysis, we view H and pi as random oracles.
The system parameter is 〈q, g,G,G1, eˆ,H, pi〉 and the master secret key is β.
Extract: For a given identification string C ∈ {0, 1}∗, the algorithm computes a generator gC = H(C) ∈ G,
and sets the private key dC = gβC where β is the master secret key. The algorithm will further compute
gS = H(S) ∈ G where S is the server identity string, and store the value
(
C, gS , d
H(α)
C
)
in the tamper
resistant smart card.
Exchange: The algorithm proceeds as follows.
1) The card selects x ∈R Z∗q , computes RA = gxC , and sends it to the Server via the card reader.
2) The Server selects y ∈R Z∗q , computes RB = gyS , and sends it to the card.
3) The card computes sA = pi(RA, RB), sB = pi(RB , RA), H(α)−1 mod q, and the shared session
key sk as
eˆ(gC , gS)
(x+sA)(y+sB)β = eˆ
(
d
(x+sA)H(α)H(α)−1
C
, gsB
S
·RB
)
.
4) The card computes K1 = H(sk, 1) and sends CC = HMACK1(C,S, RA, RB) to the server.
5) The server computes sA = pi(RA, RB), sB = pi(RB , RA) and the shared session key sk as
eˆ(gC , gS)
(x+sA)(y+sB)β = eˆ
(
gsA
C
·RA, g
(y+sB)β
S
)
.
6) The server verifies whether CC is correct. If the verification passes. The server computes K1 =
H(sk, 1) and sends CS = HMACK1(S, C, RB , RA) to the card.
7) The card verifies the value of CS .
The protocol PSCAb message flows are shown in the Figure 2
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Fig. 2. Message flows in PSCAb
Card −→ Server : gx
C
Card ←− Server : gy
S
Card −→ Server : CC
Card ←− Server : CS
In the following, we use heuristics to show that PSCAb is secure in the Type I, Type II, and Type III
security models. The security of the underlying identity based key agreement protocol IDAK [?] (it is
called Wang Key Agreement protocol in [?]) is proved in [?]. Furthermore, the eavesdropping, replay,
man-in-the-middle, impersonation, password-guessing, and partition attacks will learn nothing about the
password since no information of password is involved in these messages. Furthermore, these attackers
will learn nothing about the private keys dC and β based on the proofs in [?]. For an attacker with
access to the information dH(α)
C
(the attacker may read this information from the stolen smart card), she
may impersonate the card owner to interact with the server. Since the attacker could only compute the
value skH(α), it will not be able to generate the confirmation message CC . Thus the server will not send
the server confirmation message back to the attacker. In another word, the attacker will get no useful
information for an off-line password guessing attack. Furthermore, even if the attacker has observed
previous valid protocol runs, it will not help the attacker due to the fact that the smart card does not
contain any information of the session values x of the previous protocols runs.
Remarks: In the protocol PSCAb, it is important to have the card to send the confirmation message to
the server first. Otherwise, the protocol will not be secure in the Type III security model. Now we assume
that the server sends the first confirmation message and we present an attack in the following with this
protocol variant. After the attacker obtains the value dH(α)
C
from the smart card, she could impersonate
the user by sending the vale RA to the server. Though the attacker may not be able to compute the shared
secret sk with the server, it will be able to compute
skH(α) = eˆ
(
d
(x+sA)H(α)
C
, gsB
S
· RB
)
.
For each guessed password α′, the attacker computes a potential secret sk′ = skH(α)H(α′)−1 . If sk′ is
not consistent with the confirmation message CS from the server, the attacker could remove α′ from the
password list. Otherwise, it guessed the correct password.
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C. Public key based scheme with password validation data at server: PSCAV
In previous sections, we discussed two protocols SSCA and PSCAb that the server does not store any
password validation data. In this section, we discuss some protocols that server needs to store password
validation data for each card. One of the disadvantages of this kind of protocols is that if the card owner
wants to change her password, the server has to be involved.
It should be noted that the password based remote authentication protocols that have been specified in
the IEEE 1363.2 [?] are not secure in our models. The major reason is that the only secure credential
that a client owns is the password. If the smart card owner inputs her password on an untrusted card
reader, the card reader could just record the password and impersonates the client to the server without
the smart card in future.
Before we present our scheme PSCAV, we briefly note that the protocol PSCAb in Section III-B
can be easily modified to be a password protected smart card authentication scheme that the server
stores user password validation data. In Section III-B, the identity string for each user is computed as
gC = H(C) ∈ G. For protocols with password validation data, we can use a different way to compute
the identity strings. In particular, assume that the user U has a password α, then the identity string for
the user will be computed as gC = H(C, α) ∈ G and the private key for the user will be dC = gβC where
β is the master secret key. The value
(
C, gS , d
H(α)
C
)
will be stored in the tamper resistant smart card,
and the value gC will be stored in the server database for this user. The remaining of protocol runs the
same as in Section III-B. We can call the above mentioned protocol as PSCAbV
Now we begin to describe our main protocol PSCAV for this section. Assume that the server has a
master secret β. For each user with password α, let the user specific generator be gC = H1(C, α, β),
the value gH2(α)
C
is stored on the smart card, where H2 is another independent hash function. The value
gC = H1(C, α, β) will be stored in the server database for this user. The remaining of protocol runs as
follows:
1) The card selects random x and sends RA = gxC to the server.
2) Server selects random y and sends RB = gyC to the card.
3) The card computes u = H(C,S, RA, RB) where S is the server identity string, sk = gy(x+uα)C , and
sends Cc = H(sk, C,S, RA, RB) to the server
4) The server verifies that the Cc is correct. If the verification passes, server computes u = H(C,S, RA, RB),
sk = g
y(x+uα)
C
, and sends Cs = H(sk,S, C, RB , RA) to the card.
The protocol PSCAV message flows are the same as for the PSCAb protocol message in the Figure 2
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(but with different interpretation for the variables in the figure).
In the following, we use heuristics to show that PSCAV is secure in the Type I, Type II, and Type
III security models. For the PSCAV protocol, the eavesdropping, replay, man-in-the-middle, card (client)
impersonation, password-guessing, and partition attacks will learn nothing about the password due to the
hardness of the Diffie-Hellman problem. For the attacker that carries out a server impersonation attack,
it will receive the value RA, and send a random RB to the card. The attacker will then receive the card
confirmation message CC . The attacker may not launch an off-line dictionary attack on these information
since for each guessed password α′, it has no way to generate a session key sk′ due to the hardness
of the Diffie-Hellman problem. For an attacker with access to the information H1(C, α, β)H2(α) (the
attacker may read this information from the stolen smart card), she may impersonate the card owner to
interact with the server. The attacker may send a random RA to the server which could be based on
H1(C, α, β)
H2(α)
, and receives a value RB from the server. But it cannot compute the session key sk
based on these information. Thus it could not send the confirmation message CC to the server. Thus the
server will not send the server confirmation message back to the attacker. In another word, the attacker
will get no useful information for an off-line password guessing attack. Furthermore, even if the attacker
has observed previous valid protocol runs, it will not help the attacker due to the fact that the smart card
does not contain any information of the session values x of the previous protocols runs.
Remarks: The attack described at the end of Section III-B could be used to show that, in the protocol
PSCAV, it is important to have the card to send the confirmation message to the server first. Otherwise,
the protocol will not be secure in the Type III security model.
IV. REMOTE AUTHENTICATION WITH PASSWORD PROTECTED PORTABLE MEMORY STICKS
In this section, we investigate the scenario that the user stores her private key on a USB memory stick.
Our goal is that if the memory stick is lost, then the adversary will not be able to mount an off-line
dictionary attack to impersonate the legitimate user. Since a memory stick will not have its own CPU, the
owner has to insert the memory stick into a trusted computer (otherwise, the malicious computer could
just intercept the password and copy the content on the memory sticks and impersonates the owner in
future). Thus the security model for this kind of protocols are different from the Type I, II, III models
that we have discussed in Section II, but are closely related to the Type III model. Specifically, we will
have the following Type IV model for portable memory sticks.
• Type IV. The attacker A is allowed to watch regular runs of the protocol between a client C (together
with the memory stick and a trusted computer) and the server S , can actively communicate with
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C and S in replay, impersonation, and man-in-the-middle attacks, and can also steal the memory
stick from the user and read the content in the memory stick. A protocol is said to be secure in the
presence of such an attacker if (i) whenever the server S accepts an authentication session with C, it
is the case that the actual user U did indeed insert her memory stick into a computer C and input the
correct password in the authentication session; and (ii) whenever a client C accepts an authentication
session with S , it is the case that S did indeed participate in the authentication session and the user
U did indeed input the correct password.
Heuristics could be used to show that the protocols PSCAb from section III-B and PSCAV from section
III-C are secure in the Type IV model. Based on similar heuristics, it can also be shown that the protocol
SSCA from section III-A will be secure in modified Type IV model in the same way as the modified
security model Type III discussed in section III-A. In another word, if we revise the attacker’s capability
in Type IV model by restricting the attacker from observing any valid runs of the protocol before she
steals the memory stick, we get a new security model which we will call Type iV′ model. It can be
shown that the protocol SSCA is secure in the Type IV′ model.
Though we have showed that all of our three protocols PSCAb, PSCAV, and SSCA have similar
characteristics in both the security models Type III and Type IV, it is an open question whether the
security models Type III and Type IV are equivalent. In another word, we do not know whether there
are protocols that are secure in Type III model but not secure in Type IV model (or vice versa).
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